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Abstract 
 
 
The main research question of this paper is whether or not the risk of family 
disruption has an impact on the consumption/saving decisions of households. 
Although little empirical work exists in this area, often presenting indirect 
evidence, the theory is divided over the effect of family risk over saving and 
wealth accumulation. By using data from the Italian Survey on Households 
Income and Wealth, we build a probabilistic model to assess the probability of 
marital splitting, and then we insert this probability as a distinct or interacted 
regressor, in a statistically consistent way, into a linear model of consumption. 
Furthermore, we study the differential behaviour, in terms of 
consumption/saving choices, of couples experiencing marital splitting over the 
subsequent two years. The main result of our analysis is that family disruption 
risk generates precautionary savings, reducing current consumption. In fact, 
according to our estimates, on average, the risk of divorce generates an amount 
of additional yearly precautionary savings of around 800 euros at constant prices 
of the year 2000, which represents 11% of overall household savings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work by Leland (1968) the precautionary motive for saving has been the 
object of intense research activity.  
The precautionary motive for saving can be multi-faceted. In fact, a recent paper by Kennickell 
and Lusardi (2005) explored several sources of risk that generate a precautionary saving motive. 
This includes income risk, health risk, business risk and liquidity constraints. By using a subjective 
measure of desired precautionary savings derived from the 1995 and 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finance as dependent variable, they showed that besides earnings risk, which is usually the focus of 
the empirical literature, most other sources of risk are also relevant. 
Precautionary saving is closely intertwined with opportunities for risk sharing. Some authors 
(see, for example, Devereux and Smith (1994)) suggest that more risk sharing opportunities may 
translate into less saving, as there are better ways of dealing with the effects of uncertainty. 
The idea that marriage provides some sort of risk sharing among its members is well known. 
Ever since Becker's contributions (1973, 1974), households economics has often highlighted the 
idea that marriage engenders risk sharing among a couple. The basic idea is that transfers between 
spouses help smooth out a certain amount of variability in individual income streams. It might even 
be conceivable, as in Chami and Hess, (2005), that individuals also choose to marry in order to 
hedge against macroeconomic risks. A fairly large set of applied studies (most commonly using 
micro data) show that risk sharing does seem to occur within marriages (this is the case, for 
example, of the works by Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985, 1994; Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig 
and Stark, 1989, among the others). 
If marriage features, as a fundamental ingredient, a certain amount of trust and information, it 
may also help reduce problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and deception (as underscored 
by Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981) thereby impacting insurance markets. Moreover, transaction costs in 
marriage may be lower than those associated with formal insurance and financial instruments. As an 
insurance instrument, therefore, marriage would be particularly efficient. 
On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, most stylized models of saving do not 
explicitly account for life-changing events such as marriage and divorce, which may have sizeable 
and long-lasting implications on income and consumption patterns. 
For example, Lupton and Smith (2003) remark that “very little theoretical or empirical work 
has addressed this issue” (i.e. that of a link between marriage and saving). 
Also, as is shown in this paper, the consequences of the disruption of the family arrangement 
(i.e. the collapse of marriage), are far from clear from a consumption/saving standpoint. 
Even those few who deal with this problem do not reach unambiguous (theoretical) 
conclusions, at least as far as the effects of divorce risk on saving are concerned. 
In fact, opposing forces may be at work: on the one hand, divorce is costly (legal fees, etc...), 
and leads to a potentially very large loss of economies of scale linked to marriage. This may be 
perceived as a negative shock, which might bring about an increase in precautionary saving. On the 
other hand, in the presence of divorce prospects saving becomes riskier, as the resulting assets must 
be split among the couple, leading to a decrease in saving; moreover, divorce, or the risk thereof, 
may also decrease the return to saving for the couple, in the presence of costs cutting into the net 
worth of the couple, or in the presence of remarriage, thus diminishing the incentives to save. 
Few contributions, to date, have made an attempt to empirically assess the effect of divorce 
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risk upon consumption/saving choices, mostly using an indirect approach. For example, Gonzalez-
Ozcan (2008) present indirect evidence about the impact of divorce risk upon saving in the 
household, by considering the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996 as an exogenous increase in 
the likelihood of marital dissolution. They do find a positive relationship, resorting to a difference 
in difference estimation (though, we believe, with some problems in properly defining the control 
and treatment groups). 
A remarkable contribution to this literature is the work by Pierce and Finke (2006). By 
identifying households that will divorce over a 5 year period in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (1994-1999), they show that divorce prone households save significantly more than 
couples remaining married, in the years before the actual occurrence of divorce.  
More recently, Voena (2010) proposed a model to assess the impact of different property rights 
regimes among spouses over the accumulation of assets in the household and the supply of labor 
then tests the model by using US data. Interestingly, one of the indications of the paper is that when 
the probability of divorce increases and assets are equally split among spouses, men tend to increase 
savings (and asset accumulation), to offset the possible loss of half of their assets to wives if 
divorce comes about. 
Our paper explores the consequences of family dissolution risk onto consumption and 
(precautionary) saving, by using a very simple theoretical model, and by estimating an empirical 
model that explicitly combines an estimation of marital dissolution risk with one of 
consumption/saving. By doing so, we contribute to the rather thin body of literature dealing with a 
problem that has become increasingly important, as family instability has become more prevalent. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in paragraph 2 we propose a theoretical model 
describing consumption/savings choices for a married couple exposed to risk of marital dissolution; 
in paragraph 3 we report the results of our empirical analysis on a panel of Italian households. By 
means of a two-stage methodology, we find that the risk of divorce reduces nondurable 
consumption and generates precautionary savings, with an intensity depending on household 
income. 
 
2. A simple model of divorce risk and precautionary savings  
 
2.1. The institutional framework 
 
Before we introduce our simple theoretical model, it is useful to describe at some length the 
underlying institutional set-up, which is also the reference framework for the ensuing empirical 
analysis. This concerns the time horizon 1989-2006, which was characterized by a substantial 
stability in the set of norms regulating divorce in Italy. Indeed, divorce was introduced in Italy in 
1970 by a law that has registered only minor changes since.  
With regard to its economic aspects, the law dictates that divorce can be reached after three 
years of legal separation with an agreement between the wife and the husband, or it can be obtained 
as the result of a legal dispute. However, the divorce is always subject to the approval of a judge 
who safeguards the weak side of the couple and the children. In more detail, the use – but not the 
ownership - of the unique house where the family lives is generally assigned to the spouse obtaining 
the custody of children. Moreover, the more affluent member of the couple has to correspond to the 
wife/husband, in case of legal separation, a monthly or a lump sum payment that guarantees her/him 
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and possibly the children a lifestyle comparable to that experienced during the marriage. The stock 
of wealth owned by an individual at the time of the marriage, as well as heritages and gifts received 
during the marriage are always excluded from the stock of wealth eventually shared with the partner 
at the time of divorce. However, savings and durable goods accumulated during the marriage must 
be split equally between the husband and the wife in case of divorce, but the spouses can opt, at the 
time of marriage or even later, for an alternative “disjoint” regime, where savings and durable 
goods accumulated during the marriage are not shared with the wife/husband3.  
To sum up, within the Italian legal framework a relevant fraction of individual wealth (the 
rental income potentially obtainable from the house and/or significant fractions of current and 
future wages for wife/husband and children alimony) must be split between the husband and the 
wife at the moment of divorce, but at the same time a large fraction of individual wealth may 
remain potentially untouched by the economic agreement approved by a judge (the stock of wealth 
at the time of marriage, heritages, gifts, second houses and in most cases also personal savings and 
durables acquired within the marriage).  
As a consequence, in the Italian case it is not possible to determine a priori that 
consumption/savings choices result from an individual, rather than a unitary or a collective decision 
process, as the appropriateness of a particular model will depend on the type of household under 
analysis and, in particular, on the spouses’ initial endowments. Roughly speaking, one may 
conjecture that low-income and liquidity constrained couples cannot resort to precautionary savings 
to improve on the intertemporal distribution of consumption. On the other hand for middle-income 
couples, who generally share the ownership or the use of a unique house, the amount of wealth to 
be split at the moment of the legal separation represents a very high share of their permanent 
income, and therefore the collective choice model seems to be appropriate to describe 
consumption/savings choices. Lastly, for high-income or wealthy individuals the amount of 
resources to be split at the moment of divorce represents a marginal fraction of their permanent 
income, and therefore the individual model with partial sharing of resources seems the best to 
describe consumption/saving choices.  
 
2.2 A model of partial income pooling with heterogeneous preferences. 
 
When one tries to model household’s saving, one is faced with a fairly important challenge: 
should household decisions be analysed in the framework of a unitary model, in which the 
household behaves as if it was endowed with its own objective function and in which there is only 
one household income constraint, or with a model that recognizes that individual members of the 
household have their own utility functions and/or their own income constraints? An example of the 
latter applied to the analysis of saving decisions is Nordblom (2004). Consumption decisions of 
individuals in couples have been modelled as individual decisions e.g. by McElroy and Horney 
(1981) and Browning et al. (1994), and so have labor supply decisions (e.g. by Grossbard-
Shechtman (1984) and Chiappori (1988a, 1988b)). 
In collective models, where household preferences are a convex combination of the spouses’ 
utility function, the analysis of each partner’s preferences also becomes relevant, in terms of overall 
                                                
3 According to the latest figures available by Italy’s National Statistical Institute, this second option has been chosen by 
62.7% of all marriages celebrated in Italy in year 2008. 
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consumption and saving behaviour, investment, and other choice variables. In fact, there exists a 
rich literature on gender differences in saving behavior which explores how different attitudes 
toward risk and time as well as different socio-economic situations impact consumption/saving 
decisions. This has been mostly analyzed in the context of developed countries (see, among the 
others, Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996) and Floro and Seguino (2002, 2003), for a survey of 
empirical works and some theoretical modelling of this issue). 
Our approach, in what follows, is based on a somehow eclectic approach. We will present a 
model that we name “partial income pooling with heterogeneous preferences”, where the spouses 
independently decide over the allocation of their own income between consumption and saving, but 
also pool a fraction of their income, where half of the pooled income enters into each individual’s 
total income. This model does not belong to either the class of unitary preference models, nor to one 
of collective preference models. As it can encompass both partial and complete risk pooling, it can 
accommodate both cohabiting and married couples, and is quite similar to a model recently 
published by Nordblom (2004).  
The main research question of the model is to investigate the difference in consumption and 
saving between a couple that is not subject to marriage dissolution risk and a couple that is subject 
to marriage dissolution risk, rather than on the difference in consumption between a couple, subject 
or not to marriage dissolution risk, and two single individuals. Moreover, we will assume that the 
only decision makers in the household are the spouses, and that one of them will be dominant, as 
the primary earner, who will have to contribute some amount of money to other spouse, in case of 
divorce.  
Agents live for two periods, the second being affected by some income uncertainty, 
represented by two possible realizations of income, denoted by ly  (y low) and hy  (y high). 
We can therefore recognize four possible states of the world:  both F and M  have a low 
income, F gets a low income and M a high income, F gets a high income and M a low income, both 
F and M get a high income. The corresponding probabilities will be denoted by 1! , 2! , 3!  and 4! , 
with !!! =+ 21  and !!! "=+ 143  and, for simplicity, 32 !! =  (which also implies !!! =+ 31  
and !!! "=+ 142 ). If 032 == !! , then the income risks of the two individuals would be 
perfectly correlated, but of course this need not be the case, in general. 
Agents can save an amount S of their income at period 1, to buffer against income uncertainty 
in the second period. For simplicity, we also assume that the effects of time preference and interest 
rate cancel out. 
The aim of the model is to show that, under plausible assumptions, marital disruption risk 
increases precautionary saving, which is what we also find out empirically from our data analysis. 
As we are not specifying a particular utility function for the decision makers in the household, the 
results will hold regardless of rates of time preference, degree of risk aversion, and other individual 
specific features. 
        In our model both decision makers in the couple make a decision as to the extent of saving. 
Each decision maker (i and j) pools in both periods a fraction i! of his/her income, keeping the rest 
separate. Half of the pooled income will add to the un-pooled component of each spouse’s income. 
        We will assume that the parameters i!  and ! j , as well as the parameters! i
'  ! j
' defined in the 
following, are exogenously determined, but according to a number of models they can be derived 
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endogenously. In the models by Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1988) and Chiappori (1988a, 
1988b) the fraction of income shared depends on marriage market forces and distribution factors 
(Becker (1973) and Browning et al. (1994). 
        Each decision maker i has preferences represented by the generic instantaneous utility function 
(.)iu , accommodating all possible time preference rates and risk attitudes. Following Leland (1968) 
we will assume that the third order derivative of the utility functions be positive to have a positive 
precautionary motive.  In case of marital splitting (with probability 0>! ), the dominant spouse (i 
in the sequel) will continue to pool a fraction ! i
' <! i  which will be added to the other spouse’s 
income (this should capture alimony or other kind of transfers); the latter will, in addition, incur a 
cost of marital disruption, c.  
       The problem of agent i, denoting by ! ! 0 the probability of marital splitting, will be that of: 
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       Let us now consider the maximization problem of the other, non-dominant member of the 
household. The problem of agent j, denoting by ! ! 0 the probability of marital splitting, will be 
that of: 
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Proposition 1. Under the conditions  
 
( ) cyyyyyyyy hiijiijjjliiiljjlii !+>
+
+!>"
"
#
$
%
%
&
' + '
1
11
1
'
2
,
2
(
((
(
((
, and for a sufficiently large 
probability of getting a low income, ! , divorce risk will induce both members of a couple into 
more precautionary savings. 
 
Proof. To show that S is higher when the couple faces some divorce risk, we have to show that the 
r.hs. in (2) and (4) are larger when ! > 0 than when ! = 0 , if S is the same. To check this, let us 
rewrite the right hand sides of (2) and (4) when ! = 0  as: 
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           This can be represented graphically as shown in Figure 1a, where the right hand side of (2) in 
the case ! = 0  can be geometrically interpreted as a point X on the chord AB, where the points A 
and B, respectively, lie on the chords CD and EF. For simplicity, we set:  
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Figure 1a. The geometry of proposition 1 
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           On the other hand, condition (2) in the case ! > 0  contains, in its right hand side, a convex 
combination of the r.h.s. of (2) with an additional term, with weights )1( !"  and ! , respectively. 
The latter is also a convex combination, and can be represented as the segment  GH. 
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! is sufficiently large, point X~ will lie above AB. Any convex combination of X and X~ will 
therefore entail a level of marginal utility larger than X. To restore equality between the lhs and the 
rhs of (4), S must increase, i.e. precautionary saving must be higher. 
           Similarly, we can show the same result for the other, j, spouse. In this case, condition (4) in 
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the case ! > 0 can be written as: 
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          Setting, for simplicity: 
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         The new situation, in terms of marginal utilities, is now represented in Figure 1b. 
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likely to hold, the higher the share of income pooled by spouse i following divorce, the more similar 
the shares of income contributed by the spouses in marriage, and the more similar the levels of 
income. The second condition is more likely to hold for a relatively heavier cost of divorce for the 
weaker spouse. 
         Assuming that income sharing in the couple is endogenously determined would not radically 
alter the results of our analysis, in as much as we impose the constraints that some sharing does 
occur within marriage, and that ! i
' <! i . In fact, we are not interested in comparing levels of saving 
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B 
C 
E 
D 
between two singles and a married couple (which would be strongly influenced by the income 
sharing process within the couple), but rather in comparing the savings of a couple not affected by 
divorce risk with those of a couple more or less affected by such risks.  
 
Figure 1b. The geometry of proposition 1 
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3. Marital dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis. 
 
3.1. The empirical strategy 
 
To evaluate the empirical relevance of precautionary saving behaviour originated by the risk of 
divorce we will follow a methodology similar to the one recently used to assess the influence of 
unemployment risk on consumption choices within a micro-econometric framework (De Lucia and 
Meacci (2005), Benito (2006)), based on a two-step approach. The first stage consists in the 
estimation of a probabilistic model for generating a proxy for the risk of divorce, while in the 
second stage this generated risk variable is introduced as an additional regressor in a standard 
consumption or saving model. 
Applying this methodology to the analysis of precautionary savings generated from the risk of 
divorce presents a peculiar difficulty, originating from the fact that marital dissolution modifies the 
family’s structure, which affects the level of consumption in a complex way due to the departure of 
at least one person from the household. This event makes it impossible to disentangle the effects on 
(precautionary) savings originated from the risk of divorce from the effects on savings linked to the 
change in the family’s composition. Another difficulty arises from the fact that estimating a binary 
model in the first stage for contemporaneous marital status by employing contemporaneous socio-
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demographic and economic variables is quite problematic, as these variables are, at least up to some 
extent, both a consequence and a cause of the marital separation. Thus, the estimated parameters 
would be affected by an endogeneity bias originated by simultaneity. To overcome this difficulty 
we resort to estimating a probabilistic model where our dependent binary variable represents, 
instead of the actual marital status, the future marital status, (in two years time). A probit model for 
future marital status has been estimated out of a set of socio-demographic and economic variables 
one period (two years) before the possible occurrence of divorce. After identifying the main 
determinants of marital dissolution, we assign each household an estimate of the corresponding 
probability of divorce. In the second stage of the analysis this generated regressor is added to the set 
of explanatory variables in a rather standard consumption model to assess the impact of divorce risk 
on household consumption choices.  
 
3.2. The dataset 
 
The empirical exercise is based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW thereafter), a sample survey representative of the Italian population. The survey 
started in year 1965 and from year 1987 it has been conducted every two years, with the only 
exception being the 1998 wave, carried out three year after the 1995 one. In the period covered by 
our empirical analysis, each wave of the survey contains detailed statistics over around 8,000 
households. Since 1989 the survey includes a panel subsample whose weight has significantly 
increased over time, representing 14,6% of the interviewed households in year 1989 to a maximum 
of 50,1% of the sample size in year 2006 (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010). The SHIW survey is a 
rotating split panel, where at each wave the sample consists of a subsample of panel households 
chosen among households interviewed in the preceding wave, and a subsample of cross-section 
households, entering the sample for the first time. In years 1991 and 1993 the panel component has 
been chosen on the basis of the willingness of the family, previously expressed, towards being 
interviewed once again, while since 1995 the panel subsample has been randomly chosen within the 
cross-section component of the previous wave; this change is likely to have increased the quality of 
the sample survey, by mitigating the bias induced by self-selection of households into the panel 
(Giraldo, Rettore and Trivellato, 2001).  
The survey reports values for the main social and demographic variables for each member of 
the household such as age, marital status, professional condition, and many others. It also reports, 
aggregated at household level, data on income and savings, as well detailed data on real and 
financial wealth. By any account, this is the most frequently used dataset for carrying out micro-
econometric research in the field of consumption and saving behaviour in Italy. 
The set of available SHIW surveys has been restricted along many dimensions in our empirical 
work. First, we have restricted the analysis to a panel component of the survey, which is necessary 
if one wants to estimate a probabilistic model for future marital status, and which requires the 
availability of data for at least two consecutive surveys. The use of a rotating panel in the estimation 
significantly reduces the bias caused by non random attrition in panel datasets (Jappelli and 
Pistaferri, 2010). To select our observations, first we selected the subsample formed by all those 
households taking part in at least two consecutive surveys. Then, starting from the last available 
wave of the Survey (2006), we identified any households headed by a divorced individual. We then 
checked whether this household was also divorced in the preceding wave of the Survey. If it was, 
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the same procedure would have been reiterated one more time, to the previous wave (and so on, till 
the first wave). If the individual was married in the previous survey then this observation would 
have constituted one “divorce in two year’s time” couple, and entered into our final sample. Using 
this method we selected all households experiencing divorce in the course of their survey 
participation. Unfortunately, the total number of such households is very limited, as it seems that, 
even if only on logistic grounds (relocation of one partner, little willingness to keep on participating 
in the survey, etc…) couples experiencing divorce while they are part of our panel very often 
discontinued participation. The rest of our sample (actually, the vast majority of it) is made of 
married couples remaining such in all surveys they take part in.   
These criteria led us to identify a dataset including a total of 8,028 distinct households, with 
only 165 occurrences of divorce/separation, while the remaining 7,863 couples remain married. 
Data on consumption, savings, wealth as well as all the monetary variables have been deflated to 
their year 2000 values by using the gross domestic product deflator. In table 1 we report the main 
statistics over this selected sample for the whole sample and separately for stable and “close to 
marital split” couples. From the available statistics it turns out that divorce-prone households are 
generally held by a younger and more educated spouses and by a wife with a higher probability of 
participating in the labour force. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
We can also observe that average total consumption is larger for “risky” couples, whereas total 
wealth is smaller. Other socio-demographic variables (e.g. number of household components and 
number of income earners are quite similar across both groups). 
 
3.3. Empirical results 
 
In the first stage of the empirical analysis we estimated a probit model where the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the married couple will be divorced/separated after two years and is equal to 
0 otherwise.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
Estimation results are presented in Table 2 containing un-weighted estimates of parameters. 
Weighted estimates (which are not reported), where the weights are the inverse of the probability of 
inclusion of each family in the sample yield similar results. According to our empirical model, the 
probability of divorce depends (negatively) upon the wife's age and upon the squared age difference 
between husband and wife (positively), upon the presence of children aged less than five 
(negatively), and upon the fact she earns an annual income greater than 10,000 euros at 2000 prices 
(positively). Moreover, the probability of divorce is lower if the husband works as an employee, 
and is also affected by a positive quadratic and concave time trend. Johnson and Skinner (1986), 
using data from the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics, found that in the United States women 
which subsequently divorce tend to increase their labour supply in the three years preceding the 
separation. This means that labour supply is potentially endogenous, which might lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the single equation probit model for divorce. Therefore we have tested the 
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assumption of exogeneity over the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the women earns more 
than a certain threshold (10,000 euros at constant prices of year 2000) and is equal to 0 otherwise.  
To do so, we have implemented the procedure by Rivers and Vuong (1988), as suggested by 
Wooldrige (2002).  
In more detail, we regressed our potentially endogenous variable on all the remaining 
exogenous variables on the right hand side of the equation plus the number of years of education of 
the wife, a variable which is strongly significant in this auxiliary regression but scarcely so in the 
probit model. We then included the residuals of this auxiliary regression in the probit model and 
estimated a statistically insignificant coefficient (with a p-value equal to 0.6); this suggests that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity. As an additional robustness check we have estimated the 
simultaneous bivariate probit (with dependent variables “the couple will divorce within two years” 
and “the wife earns at least than 10,000 euros at constant prices of year 2000”) by maximum 
likelihood and again we have found that the correlation between the residuals in the two equation is 
not significantly different from zero (with a p-value equal to 0.7), as shown in table 3 
 
[Table 3] 
 
In order to assess the classificatory performance of our model we have chosen as cut-off point 
the average incidence of divorce observed in the sample, which is around 2 percentage points. The 
results obtained (reported in table 4) indicate that our model classifies correctly around two thirds of 
the observations. The major shortcoming of the estimated model consists in the fact that it often 
predicts divorce when it actually does not occur in our dataset, most likely because we do not 
observe the entire history of marriages, but only a short fraction of that; this is also reflected in the 
fact that over a longer time span the probability of divorce is higher than the one observed in our 
dataset. Indeed, according to statistics released by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT), 
in 2005 the average occurrence of marital separation (including divorce) reached the value of 27% 
within the overall number of marriages. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
Next, we estimate two linear models where the dependent variables are, respectively, 
household nondurable consumption and saving, and where we include among regressors household 
income, the interaction of household income and the risk of divorce and a set of socio-demographic 
controls. The estimation results are reported in Table 5, and show that nondurable consumption 
positively depends on income, but in a concave fashion, and that income interacts significantly with 
the risk of divorce in the consumption equation. On the other hand, we did not find any significant 
effect of the probability of divorce as a distinct variable. This is consistent with simple models of 
precautionary savings (for an example, see Eisenhauer and Ventura (2005)), where it becomes 
evident that, even in simple two period models, the coefficient of relative prudence must be 
interacted with risky income to determine the overall effect of risk over savings; risky income is 
proxied, in our analysis, by the probability of divorce times income. Moreover, nondurable 
consumption depends, positively, on the number of adults and children living in the household, 
whether the family lives in a big city (more than 500,000 inhabitants) or in a southern region and 
whether the family owns even partially the house where live they. 
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[Table 5] 
 
Lastly, nondurable consumption depends negatively on whether or not the wife is working,  
whether the wife is self employed, whether the husband is self-employed and lastly, on the wife and 
husband’s educational attainments.  
In many ways we can see that the consumption model is identified. First and foremost, many of 
the regressors included in the first stage Probit model (namely the age of wife, the squared age 
difference between the spouses, the presence of children aged less than five, the working status of 
the husband, the wife earnings dummy) do not display statistically significant coefficients when 
included in the consumption equation (results not reported, but available on request). Secondly, our 
risk variable does not enter the consumption model as such, but interacted with income, which 
would greatly reduce a hypothetical identification problem. Lastly, the first stage estimation is non 
linear, which also greatly reduces the extent of an identification problem, even if the variables 
included in both equations (the non linear and the linear one) were exactly the same (see Wooldrige, 
2002).  
A similar analysis has been conducted for durable savings, but we did not find any significant 
effect of divorce risk. Conversely, we did find a positive effect of divorce risk on overall household 
savings, as can be seen from the following table, supporting the theoretical prediction that the 
higher the risk of divorce, the higher the extent of savings.  
 
[Table 6] 
 
As shown in table 7, the interacted variable, i.e. the risk of divorce times income, would be 
responsible, on average, for around 800 euros of savings, which accounts for about 11% of mean 
overall savings. 
 
[Table 7] 
 
In the spirit of Pierce and Finke (2006) we have also performed a different exercise, consisting 
of the following steps: 
1) rather than estimating the probability of marital disruption for each household of the sample, 
instead we directly included in our analysis a dummy variable equal to 0 if the married couple will 
be still married after two years and equal to 1 if the married couple will experience marital 
disruption within the following two years (this is actually the same variable as the one on the left 
hand side of the probit model reported in the preceding pages). 
2) In order to get a more balanced sample, and account for the relative low incidence of 
divorces (165) in our sample, we have drawn a random subsample from the original set of 8028 
households so as to obtain a dataset where the percentage of (future) marital disrupted couples is in 
line with the real cross-sectional incidence of the phenomena in the sample survey. Before that, 
however, we have compared the divorced households present in two subsequent waves with those 
present only in one wave, just to be sure that the fact of surviving one more period in the Survey 
does not correspond to some specific feature or behaviour, which might create some sample 
selection bias. As should be clear from a cursory reading of table 8, this does not seem to be the 
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case. 
[Table 8] 
 
3) Lastly, a log-linear regression model for non durable consumption has been run by using 
this dummy variable, instead of the probability of marital splitting, as in the previous consumption 
equation. This way, we could analyze the differential behaviour in consumption of households 
actually running into a marital splitting in the following two years, as opposed to households 
remaining stable over the same horizon.  
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 9; the estimates (weakly) support the view 
that future marital disruption positively affects the level of consumption, but the interaction 
between the logarithm of income and the divorce variable negatively affects the logarithm of 
nondurable consumption, implying that households experiencing marital disruption within a fairly 
short horizon feature a lower elasticity of consumption over labour income, together with a higher 
level of autonomous consumption. The overall (differential) effect upon saving will therefore 
depend on the level of income. 
       [Table 9] 
 
 
    
  4. Concluding remarks 
 
The empirical findings presented in this paper point to an important role played by marital 
disruption risk in generating more precautionary savings. This has been rationalized by means of a 
simplified theoretical model, showing that an increase in the objective probability of marital 
disruption has an indeterminate effect on household consumption and (precautionary) savings. 
Our empirical analysis points at an increase in (precautionary) savings for those couples more 
likely to experience family distress. This appears to be true for non durable consumption, while we 
did not find any similar effect on durable consumption.  
We also followed an alternative empirical strategy, where instead of estimating a risk of 
divorce, we directly augmented the consumption model with a dummy variable defining future 
marital status, supporting the view that a married couple may reduce their marginal propensity to 
consume while approaching marital disruption. The research in the field seems to be strongly 
conditioned, at least in the Italian case, by the absence of a unique dataset containing detailed 
information on consumption/saving behaviour and the marital history of the couple. With regard to 
the quality of data, a very useful piece of information would be the duration of marriage, as many 
demographic studies have shown that it is possible to increase the accuracy of the prediction over 
marital disruption – with respect to a probit model - by using non parametric hazard models for 
marital disruption.  
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Table 1. Main statistics for married couples in the selected sample, years 1989-2006 
(average values, when not otherwise specified) 
 
 
Married couples 
Married couples 
which are still 
married after two 
years 
Married couples 
which are 
separated/divorced 
after two years 
    
Resident in North 39.7% 39.5% 45.5% 
    
Resident in the Middle 20.6% 20.5% 24.8% 
    
Resident in the South or Islands 39.7% 40.0% 29.7% 
    
No. of household components 3.4 3.4 3.4 
    
No. of children 1.3 1.3 1.3 
    
No. of income earners 1.9 1.9 1.8 
    
Age of the husband 53.6 53.8 45.1 
    
Age of the wife 49.9 50.1 41.6 
    
Educational attainment of the husband (1-6) 3.1 3.1 3.3 
    
Educational attainment of the wife (1-6) 2.9 2.9 3.3 
    
The husband works as employee 42.9% 42.8% 50.3% 
    
The husband works as self-employed 17.3% 17.1% 26.7% 
    
The husband is retired or out of the labour force 39.7% 40.1% 23.0% 
    
The wife works as employee 25.6% 25.2% 45.5% 
    
The wife works as self-employed 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 
    
The wife is retired or out of the labour force 67.7% 68.1% 47.9% 
    
Propensity to consume (median value) 0.78 0.78 0.80 
    
Household income 30,010 29,991 30,878 
    
Total consumption 21,908 21,874 23,569 
    
Nondurable monetary consumption 14,872 14,858 15,530 
    
Durable consumption 1,881 1,867 2,558 
    
Savings 7,368 7,378 6,890 
    
Net wealth 192,397 192,828 171,852 
    
Net wealth in the house where the family lives 108,849 109,018 100,798 
    
Number of observations 8,028 7,863 165 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in euros at constant prices of year 2000. The propensity to consume is a ratio whose 
empirical distribution is highly skewed and thus we report the median value instead of the average. 
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Table 2. Probit analysis – Dependent variable: the couple will divorce within two years 
 
Independent variables Coefficients Marginal effects 
   
Age of the wife -0.029*** 
0.004 
-0.001*** 
0.000 
   
Squared age difference between husband and wife 0.001** 
0.000 
0.000** 
0.000 
   
Presence of at least one child aged less than five -0.231*** 
0.081 
-0.008*** 
0.003 
   
The husband works as employee -0.190** 
0.074 
-0.007** 
0.003 
   
The wife earns at least 10,000 euros per year 0.278*** 
0.070 
0.011*** 
0.003 
   
Time trend 0.146*** 
0.029 
0.005*** 
0.001 
   
Time trend squared -0.009*** 
0.002 
-0.000*** 
0.000 
   
Constant -1.115*** 
0.207 
 
 
Number of observations  8,028 
Pseudo R-squared  0.085 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks correspond to significance levels respectively of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, under the coefficients 
are reported the standard errors of parameter estimates. Marginal effects are computed at average values for continuous 
variables, while for binary regressors it is reported the change in the estimated probability of divorce when the variable  
changes from 0 to 1. 
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Table 3. Biprobit analysis – Dependent variables: “the couple will divorce within two years” and “the wife earns at 
least than 10,000 euros at constant prices of year 2000” 
 
Independent variables\Dependent Variables The couple will divorce within two years 
The wife earns no less than 
10,000 euros 
   
Age of the wife -0.029*** 
0.004 
-0.002 
0.002 
   
Squared age difference between husband and wife 0.001** 
0.000 
-0.001* 
0.000 
   
Presence of at least one child aged less than five -0.235*** 
0.082 
-0.297*** 
0.041 
   
The husband works as employee -0.186** 
0.075 
0.094** 
0.039 
   
The wife earns at least 10,000 euros per year 0.221 
0.157 
 
 
   
Time trend 0.147*** 
0.029 
-0.008 
0.013 
   
Time trend squared -0.009*** 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
   
Years of education of the wife  0.159*** 
0.004 
 
   
Constant -1.090*** 
0.217 
-1.978*** 
0.114 
Number of observations 8,028 8,028 
Likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis rho=0  Chi2(1)=0.16 P-value=0.69 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks correspond to significance levels respectively of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, under the coefficients 
are reported the standard errors of parameter estimates. This model (Greene, 2003) has a recursive structure where in the 
second equation does not compare the first endogenous regressor. However it has been proved (Maddala, 1983) that the 
likelihood of this model is equivalent to that of a model where the endogenous nature of the first binary regressor is explicitly 
taken into account by including it on the right hand side of the second equation. This model (Wooldrige, 2002) can be 
employed to test the hypothesis of endogeneity of the second regressor by testing the hypothesis that the correlation coefficient 
between residuals is equal to zero. If this is the case, one falls into the case of the ordinary probit model, that is nested into this 
system of simultaneous equations. 
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Table 4. Probit analysis – Classificatory performance of the model 
(the couples are classified + if the predicted Pr(d)>=0.02) 
 
True  
Classified 
The couple will 
separate/divorce within 2 
years 
The couple will remain 
married within 2 years Total 
    
+ 126 2829 2955 
    
- 39 5034 5073 
    
Total 165 7863 8028 
Correctly classified 64.3% 
 
Table 5. Regression analysis – Dependent variable: nondurable household consumption at constant prices 
 
Independent variables Coefficients 
  
Household’s income 0.268*** 
0.007 
Squared household’s income -0.000*** 
0.000 
Risk of divorce * Household’s income -0.732*** 
0.109 
Number of adults (aged more than 14) 805.853*** 
100.501 
Number of children 447.634*** 
92.259 
The family lives in a big city (more than 500,000 inhabitants) 464.144* 
252.126 
The family lives in a southern region -975.876*** 
163.458 
The family owns even partially the house where it lives -2,204.175*** 
165.853 
The wife does not work out of home -1,288.112*** 
197.782 
The wife works as self employee -945.979*** 
322.184 
The husband works as self employee 1,213.461*** 
203.512 
Years of education of the wife 89.646*** 
23.447 
Years of education of the husband 112.689*** 
22.441 
Time trend -209.868*** 
59.834 
Squared time trend 11.110*** 
3.585 
Constant 6,649.455*** 
391.668 
Number of observations 8028 
R-squared 0.38 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks correspond to significance levels respectively of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, under the coefficients 
are reported standard errors of parameter estimates. Given that this regression includes a generated regressor (the probability of 
divorce), we have computed consistent standard errors using Murphy and Topel’s procedure (1985). 
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Table 6. Regression analysis – Dependent variable: Household Savings at constant prices 
 
Independent variables Coefficients 
  
Household’s income 0.425*** 
0.011 
Squared household’s income 0.000*** 
0.000 
Risk of divorce * Household’s income 1.193*** 
0.155 
Number of adults (aged more than 14) 70.688 
143.032 
Number of children -756.379*** 
131.301 
The family lives in a big city (more than 500,000 inhabitants) -762.616** 
358.822 
The family lives in a southern region 1,274.499*** 
232.632 
The family owns even partially the house where it lives -182.394 
236.040 
The wife does not work out of home 409.251 
281.480 
The wife works as self employee 690.609 
458.528 
The husband works as self employee -2,345.426*** 
289.635 
Years of education of the wife -103.210*** 
33.369 
Years of education of the husband -145.142*** 
31.938 
Trend -13.427 
85.155 
Squared time trend -3.370 
5.101 
Constant -3,483.102*** 
557.417 
Number of observations 8028 
R-squared 0.65 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks correspond to significance levels respectively of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, under the coefficients 
are reported standard errors of parameter estimates. Given that this regression includes a generated regressor (the probability of 
divorce), we have computed consistent standard errors using Murphy and Topel’s procedure (1985). 
 
  
23 
 Table 7. Summary statistics on precautionary savings generated by the risk of divorce 
 
Percentiles Precautionary Savings generated by the risk of divorce 
Confidence Interval 
[95% interval] 
   
10 66.1 [57.5-74.7] 
   
20 124.6 [108.4-140.8] 
   
30 203.3 [176.9-229.6] 
   
40 296.8 [258.3-335.2] 
   
50 412.9 [359.4-466.5] 
   
60 577.8 [502.9-652.8] 
   
70 824.2 [717.4-931.1] 
   
80 1182.8 [1029.4-1336.1] 
   
90 1939.9 [1688.4-2191.3] 
   
Mean 797.1 [693.4-900.8] 
   
   
Number of observations 8,028 
 
Note: the percentiles are computed on the empirical distribution of the interacted regressor Risk of divorce * Household 
Income. 
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Table 8. A comparison between divorced couples in the whole  SHIW dataset and the panel subsample 
 employed for the analysis of this paper, year 1989-2006. 
(average values) 
 
 
Divorced couples in the 
Survey 
Divorced couples in 
the panel subsample 
   
Resident in North 56,7% 45.5%*** 
   
Resident in the Middle 22,7% 24.8% 
   
Resident in the South or Islands 20,6% 29.7%*** 
   
No. of household components 1.9 2.0* 
   
No. of children 0.7 0.8 
   
No. of income earners 1.3 1.4 
   
Propensity to consume (median value) 0.85 0.88 
   
Household income 22,235 22,460 
   
Total consumption 17,203 18,737* 
   
Nondurable monetary consumption 11,838 11,950 
   
Durable consumption 1,446 1,979 
   
Savings 5,032 3,723 
   
Net wealth 134,223 140,957 
   
Net wealth in the house where the family lives 73,456 76,966 
   
Number of observations 
 
Sample size 
 
Divorced households in the sample 
 
3,108 
 
63,167 
 
4,9% 
165 
 
8,028 
 
2,1% 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in euros at constant prices of year 2000. One, two and three asterisks 
correspond to p-values respectively lower than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 for the null hypothesis that the values 
reported for the variables are equal in the two samples. We have conducted the chi-square test in the case of 
binary variables, and a bilateral t-test in the case of discrete or quantitative variables. The propensity to consume 
is a ratio whose empirical distribution is highly skewed and thus we report the median value instead of the 
average. 
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Table 9. Regression analysis – Dependent variable: Logarithm of Nondurable Consumption 
 
Independent variables Coefficients 
  
Logarithm of household income 0.453*** 
0.019 
  
Number of adults (aged more than 14) 0.033*** 
0.009 
  
Number of children 0.057*** 
0.009 
  
The family owns even partially the house where it lives -0.183*** 
0.016 
  
The wife does not work out of home -0.052*** 
0.018 
  
The family lives in a southern region -0.059*** 
0.017 
  
The family will divorce within two years 1.146* 
0.647 
  
The family will divorce within two years * Logarithm of household income -0.111* 
0.063 
  
Time trend -0.028*** 
0.005 
  
Squared time trend 0.002*** 
0.000 
  
Constant 4.996*** 
0.195 
  
Number of observations 2,317 
R-squared 0.44 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks correspond to significance levels respectively of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, under the coefficients 
are reported robust standard errors of parameter estimates. 
 
 
 
